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Abstract
In this paper, we carry out a historical evaluation of the nancial accelerator
e¤ects, which were mainly generated by the changes in asset prices, operating
on Japans economy since the 1980s. For this purpose, we estimate a Japanese
nancial accelerator model, which is a modied version of Bernanke, Gertler
and Gilchrist [1999]s model, and identify the historical exogenous shocks af-
fecting the evolution of rms net worth. As a result, we conrm that the
estimated parameter on the corporate balance sheet channel is statistically
signicant. We also nd that the identied net worth shocks, which change
the amount of rmsdebt holdings relative to their total values, produced a
large and persistent impact on Japans output and prices. This result strongly
suggests that the negative nancial accelerator e¤ects were indispensable to
explain the mechanism behind Japans long stagnation during the 1990s and
early 2000s, as well as indicating that the deation of general prices since the
late 1990s has been at least partly attributed to the same cause.
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1 Introduction
Japans economy experienced prolonged adjustment from the early 1990s through
2002 when the economy started to recover. This period was characterized by declines
in asset prices, the risk-taking ability of nancial institutions, potential economic
growth, and general prices. Various investigations have been carried out to examine
which of these factors was the major cause of the stagnation of the economy. In this
paper, we choose to focus on the e¤ect of the fall in asset prices associated with the
bursting of the bubble. This plunge in asset prices reduced rmsnet worth, resulting
in an increase in their debt/equity ratio which became a serious problem.
The e¤ect by which excessive debt acts to constrain economic growth is explained
in terms of the nancial accelerator mechanism. When there is asymmetric informa-
tion between borrowers and lenders (i.e., between rms and banks) there is a positive
relation between the amount of debt holdings and the size of external nance pre-
miums. If capital positions worsen due to a decline in stock prices, in other words
if debt holdings increase relative to capital, rms face a higher external nance pre-
mium, and this in turn constrains their investment. A leading study of the nancial
accelerator mechanism has been provided by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist [1999],
for the case of the United States.
The e¤ect of the nancial accelerator has been seen more distinctly in Japan.
Since the latter half of the 1980s, Japans economy has experienced the expansion
and bursting of bubbles in asset prices (Okina, Shiratsuka, and Shirakawa [2001]).
The Nikkei 225 experienced headlong growth between 1986 and 1989, hitting a peak
of U38,915 at the end of 1989, which was 3.1 times higher than its level at the
time of the Plaza Agreement in September 1985 (U12,598). The index then fell
sharply to U14,309 in August 1992, more than 60% below its peak. More recently,
it plumbed new depths in April 2003 (U7,909), at which point it was nearly 80%
below its peak. On the other hand, Japans economy emerged from a cyclical trough
in November 1986 and expanded for 51 months until February 1991, with annual
real GDP growth averaging around 5%. This was followed by a prolonged period
of adjustment, including some small cyclical uctuations, which bottomed out in
scal 2001. Annual real GDP growth during this period averaged -1.2%. The rate
of increase in the CPI (excluding fresh foods) recorded above 3% from the autumn
of 1990 to the summer of 1991, but it has remained consistently under 0% since the
middle of 1998.
In an e¤ort to explain the theoretical background for these phenomena, Fukunaga
[2002] used calibration to analyze nancial accelerator e¤ects in Japan. In our paper,
we go a step further, providing a full-blown empirical examination of the e¤ect of the
nancial accelerator on Japans economy. More concretely, we estimate a version of
the nancial accelerator model using Japanese data, and identify the historical exoge-
nous shocks to rmsnet worth responsible for nancial accelerator e¤ects in Japan.
In this way, we are able to investigate the extent to which Japanese macroeconomic
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variables such as investment, real GDP, and the CPI have historically been a¤ected
by the nancial accelerator. Our model analysis demonstrates that rmsexcessive
debt problem was the major factor constraining aggregate demand for a long time.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 uses vector auto regressions (VARs) to
present a preliminary analysis of how changes in the value of rms triggered by the fall
in asset prices have a¤ected the Japanese economy and vice versa. Section 3 explains
the structure of the Japanese nancial accelerator model, which is a modied version
of Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrists model. Section 4 shows the GMM (generalized
method of the moments) estimation results of the model presented in Section 3.
Section 5 simulates the e¤ect of the nancial accelerator on economic activity and
prices in Japan since the 1980s using the model estimated in Section 4. Based on
the results obtained in Section 5, Section 6 discusses the reasons for the prolonged
period of economic adjustment since the 1990s. Lastly, Section 7 o¤ers our concluding
remarks.
2 Preliminary Analysis of VARs
Before weighing into the main analysis, we conrm the statistical importance of rms
excessive debt in explaining the dynamics of Japans economy. For this purpose, we
rst carry out a simple VAR analysis, which is independent of any specic economic
theory.
Our methodology essentially follows Leeper, Sims and Zha [1996]. That is, as basic
variables, we choose the CPI (log), real GDP (log), O/N call rate, and the money
supply (M1, log). In addition, as an indicator of excessive rm debt, we include
rmsequity-value ratio (EVR), which is calculated as the total value of rmsequity
divided by the total value of rms given in the Flow of Funds Statistics 1. Since 1-
EVR represents the aggregate leverage ratio (ratio of debts / value of rms), a small
EVR means that rms have heavy debt burdens.
The data is quarterly and the sample period is from 1971Q1 to 1999Q1. Because
Japans economy has recently come up against the zero bound on the short-term
nominal interest rate, we intentionally leave out the recent data so as to exclude the
inuence of nonlinearity arising from the zero bound.
In identifying VARs, we tried many permutations of recursive ordering. Presenting
all the results here would be tedious. In the event, we selected one specic ordering
for our main VARs 2. The main VAR ordering is (i) EVR, (ii) CPI, (iii) real GDP,
(iv) O/N call rate, and (v) the money supply (M1). We consider this ordering to
be fairly natural since many previous studies assume that real economic variables
inuence monetary variables within a single period, but that the converse does not
hold. A slight complication was presented by EVR, since it was not immediately
1The movement of Japanese EVR over time is presented in Figure 1.
2However, in many trials, we nd that the results do not substantially depend on ordering.
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clear where it should be placed in the ordering because few VAR studies include this
variable. The process of estimating many patterns of recursive ordering revealed,
however, that the results do not substantially depend on the ordering of EVR and
so, in the subsequent argument, we only refer to the results of our main VARs.
Figure 2 shows the impulse responses of the variables in our main VARs to a
+1% temporary EVR shock 3. In the absence of nancial frictions, EVR should be
irrelevant for the determination of real GDP, as the famous Modigliani and Miller
[1958] theorem (MM theorem) suggests. However, the impulse response in Figure 2
indicates that, after a positive shock to EVR, real GDP goes persistently upward. The
CPI also rises, after a lag (7 quarters). O/N call rate goes down to begin with, but
afterwards rises. M1 goes persistently upward. Overall, we nd that the directions
of these responses are mostly consistent with the nancial accelerator story 4.
Figure 3 shows the variance decomposition for the main VARs. The EVR shocks
are seen to explain about 20% of the uctuations in real GDP point estimates. In
contrast, EVR contributes little to the CPI. These results are largely consistent with
the impulse responses presented in Figure 2.
Next, we nd that more than 80% of EVR uctuations are explained by the EVR
shock itself, even after 16 periods. This reects two characteristics of EVR. First,
EVR adjusts extremely slowly in Japan. The implication is that there exist quan-
titative constraints which prevent rms from freely adjusting their balance sheets.
That is, rms may experience di¢ culties raising capital or obtaining liquidity to re-
pay debts, and this prevents them from altering the make-up of the liability side of
their balance sheets immediately. Second, the movement of EVR is fairly autonomous
because it tends to be independent of feedback from real GDP or the CPI. Figure 4
helps us to understand this phenomenon. The solid line depicts the historical EVR
shocks identied in the main VARs. This series is much alike the dashed line which
indicates the percentage increase in the stock price index (TOPIX). Thus, we can
imagine that not all, but a large part of the historical EVR shocks may be attributed
to exogenous uctuations in equity prices. This suggests that, in Japan, the nan-
cial accelerator has acted as an autonomous net worth shock a¤ecting rmsbalance
sheets, rather than as an amplier of other shocks, such as technological shocks or
monetary policy shocks.
In this section, a statistical approach has been used to demonstrate that, in Japan,
uctuations in the leverage ratio, caused mainly by exogenous shocks to equity prices,
have exerted a persistent inuence on macroeconomic variables such as real GDP. In
the next section, we present a version of the nancial accelerator model, which can
3As in previous VAR studies using US data, we see the so-called liquidity and price puzzles here.
That is, the call rate does not fall at all in response to a positive money supply shock; the CPI rises
for some periods in response to a positive call rate shock.
4Unfortunately, since standard errors are somewhat large, it is not entirely certain whether these
positive responses are statistically signicant. This requires us to check the statistical signicance of
the parameter on the balance sheet channel in a more formal way, by estimating a structural model.
This is done in Section 4.
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replicate the main characteristics of this sections VARs.
3 Structural Model
In this section, we present a Japanese nancial accelerator model, which is a modi-
ed version of the Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist [1999] (BGG) model. The main
modications are twofold. First, in order to replicate the sluggish adjustment of
Japanese rmsEVR, observed in the VARs in the previous section, we modify the
nancial contract between lenders (households) and borrowers (intermediate goods
rms). We assume that rms are faced with some quantitative constraints in raising
external funds, so they cannot adjust EVR perfectly in every period. We consider
such assumption necessary to explain the sluggish movement of Japanese EVR 5.
The second modication is to introduce heterogeneity in nal output goods.
Specically, we assume that there are two types of nal goods, consumption goods
and investment goods. This modication is motivated by the fact that ination rates
for these two types of goods are quite di¤erent in Japan, mainly reecting the rapid
productivity growth in the investment goods sector. In order to bring this feature
into our analysis, we divide the production sector into consumption goods sector
and investment goods sector. As we will see later, this modication proves useful in
estimating the Japanese nancial accelerator model.
3.1 Overview of Model Structure
Figure 5 presents an overview of the model structure. The production sector consists
of intermediate goods rms, consumption goods rms, and investment goods rms.
All these rms are perfectly competitive.
Intermediate goods rms produce intermediate goods using labor and capital.
They also produce new capital by combining old capital with purchased investment
goods. Capital is traded across intermediate goods rms in the capital market. In
purchasing capital, rms need to raise funds. This has to be done by (i) issuing stocks,
(ii) uncollateralized borrowing, or (iii) collateralized borrowing. Households provide
these external funds, but they are unable to observe the realized rate of return to
capital, which is inuenced by idiosyncratic shocks, without paying some monitoring
costs even in the ex post stage. Because of this kind of asymmetric information
problem, intermediate goods rms have to pay external fund premiums.
Final goods (consumption goods and investment goods) rms use intermediate
goods to produce nal goods. Consumption goods and the investment goods have
di¤erent productivity growth rates. Final goods are sold to monopolistic competitive
5In an empirical study of Japanese rmscapital structures using panel data, Baba and Nishioka
[2004] introduces a process of partial adjustment from actual to optimal leverage ratios. They nd
that the partial adjustment process successfully captures the transition of the Japanese leverage ratio,
and that the speed of adjustment signicantly depends on rmscorporate governance structures.
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retailers, who are specialized in each of the nal goods. Consumption goods retailers
sell consumption goods to households and the government, and investment goods
retailers sell investment goods to intermediate goods rms.
Households consume, hold money, and provide labor. For simplicity, we treat
the government as an integrated government, which includes the central bank.
Therefore, the government not only purchases consumption goods and collects lump-
sum taxes, but also creates money and controls the risk-free interest rate based on a
monetary policy rule.
3.2 Intermediate Goods Firms
There are a number of intermediate goods rms. Each intermediate goods rm is en-
gaged in (i) intermediate goods production and (ii) capital accumulation. We assume
that an individual intermediate goods rm can participate in these two di¤erent ac-
tivities simultaneously. That is, in intermediate goods production, a rm purchases
labor from households and capital from other intermediate goods rms, and uses
them to produce intermediate goods. In capital accumulation, the rm purchases
investment goods from investment goods retailers, and combines investment goods
with old capital to produce new capital. Capital is traded across intermediate goods
rms in the capital market. As in BGG, when an intermediate goods rm purchases
capital from another rm, the rm is faced with an asymmetric information problem.
3.2.1 Production Technology
Intermediate goods rms use capital and labor to produce intermediate goods. The
aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas:
Ym;t = AmK

t 1H
1 
t ; (1)
where Ym;t is the aggregate quantity of intermediate goods, Am is the aggregate
productivity of intermediate goods production, Kt 1 is the aggregate capital stock
(held by intermediate goods rms at the end of period t   1 or at the beginning
of period t), and Ht is total labor hours, which is the product of average hours
(ht) and labor (Lt). Here, we assume that aggregate productivity is time-invariant,
which means that productivity growth does not arise in aggregate intermediate goods
production 6.
3.2.2 Capital Accumulation
Intermediate goods rms purchase investment goods from investment goods retailers.
Then, rms combine intermediate goods with old capital to produce new capital. The
6Later we allow productivity growth to arise in nal goods production. Since our estimated model
is based on only nal goods production, the assumption of non-productivity growth in intermediate
goods rms is not essential in this analysis.
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technology governing aggregate capital stock accumulation is
Kt = (1  )Kt 1 + 

It
Kt 1

Kt 1: (2)
Here,  is depreciation rate, and production function for new capital (()) satises
(0) = 0; 0() > 0; and 00() < 0.
3.2.3 Prot Maximization
In period t0, intermediate goods rms maximize expected discounted prots, subject
to production and capital accumulation technologies, as follows:
Et0
1P
t=t0
t0pt (Pm;tYm;t   Pi;tIt  WtHt) ; (3)
where t0pt is the discount factor from period t0 to t, Pm;t is the price of intermediate
goods, Wt is the nominal wage rate, and Pi;t is the retail price of investment goods at
period t 7. We substitute (1) into (3), and maximize (3) subject to (2), by controlling
capital (fKtg1t=t0), investment goods (fItg
1
t=t0
), and labor (fHtg1t=t0).
Let t be the Lagrange multiplier for constraint (2) in period t. Then, for all
t = t0;   ;1, the rst order conditions for capital, investment, and labor are as
follows:
t0ptPm;tAmK
 1
t 1 H
1 
t +t 1+t

 (1  )  

It
Kt 1

+ 0

It
Kt 1

It
Kt 1

= 0;
(4)
 t0ptPi;t   t0

It
Kt 1

= 0; (5)
(1  )Pm;tAmKt 1H t  Wt = 0: (6)
In the above prot maximization problem, we do not explicitly describe capital
trading activity, since this activity is cancelled out at the aggregate level. However,
at the individual rm level, trading is actually carried out in the capital market at
some price. Let Qk;t be the unit market price of capital in period t. Individual rms
prot maximization determines Qk;t as follows 8:
Qk;t = 
0

It
Kt 1
 1
Pi;t: (7)
7t0pt is determined later in the households optimization problem (Section 3.5).
8Here we assume that individual rm j accumulates capital (Kt(j)) according to
Kt(j) = (1  )Kt 1(j) + 

It(j)
Kt 1(j)

Kt 1(j);
where Kt 1(j) is the capital held by j at the beginning of period t, and It(j) is the investment goods
purchased by j and used to produce new capital during period t.
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Next, let Rk;t be the rate of return to capital from period t  1 to t. Notice that,
in equilibrium, Rk;t must be equal to the discount rate (t0pt 1=t0pt). Then, from
equations (4), (5), and (7), Rk;t is determined as follows 9:
Rk;t =
Pi;t
Pi;t 1
( Pm;t
Pi;t
Ym;t
Kt 1
+
Qk;t
Pi;t
(1  )
Qk;t 1
Pi;t 1
)
: (8)
3.2.4 Financial Constraints in Purchasing Capital
As in BGG, our intermediate goods rms have to raise external funds in purchasing
capital. Suppose that, in period t   1, an individual intermediate goods rm j has
purchased capital (Kt 1(j)) at price Qk;t 1. Firm j has nanced this purchase using
three kinds of nancial instruments; (i) stock issuing (St 1(j)), (ii) uncollateralized
borrowing (Dt 1(j)), and (iii) collateralized borrowing (Ft 1(j)). Thus, given the
stock price Qs;t 1, the following equation has to hold in period t  1:
Qk;t 1Kt 1(j) = Qs;t 1St 1(j) +Dt 1(j) + Ft 1(j): (9)
The rates of return on uncollateralized borrowing (Rd;t 1) and collateralized borrow-
ing (Rf;t 1) are xed by contract in period t  1.
In period t, the return on capital is realized. The rate of return is !t(j)Rk;t, which
is a mixture of the idiosyncratic shock (!t(j)) and the aggregate rate of return on
capital (Rk;t). The idiosyncratic shock is i.i.d. It has a c.d.f F (!t(j)), over a non-
negative support, with E(!t(j)) = 1 for all j and t. The rate of return to rm js
stock holders (Rs;t(j)) is thus determined as follows:
!t(j)Rk;tQk;t 1Kt 1(j) = Rs;t(j)Qs;t 1St 1(j) +Rd;t 1Dt 1(j) +Rf;t 1Ft 1(j): (10)
Thus, stock holders only receive the residual return (Rs;t(j)Qs;t 1St 1(j)), which is
the total return on capital minus the total return on debts. Because the rate of return
on capital is subject to an idiosyncratic shock, the rate of return on stocks (Rs;t(j))
is also a¤ected by this shock.
Here we assume that stock holders cannot observe the realized return on capital
(!t(j)Rk;t), without paying monitoring costs. Stock holders have to pay monitoring
cost  s (in gross term) per unit of nominal stock 10. That is, the total monitoring
cost of holding rm js stocks is  sQs;t 1St 1(j).
Let !t(j) be the threshold value of !t(j), which makes Rs;t zero:
!t(j)Rk;tQk;t 1Kt 1(j) = Rd;t 1Dt 1(j) +Rf;t 1Ft 1(j): (11)
9Here we normalize the adjustment cost function so that  (1) = 1 and 0 (I=K) 1 = 1 in steady
state.
10In this analysis, we do not derive the monitoring costs within the framework of optimal contracts,
but simply assume external lenders incur constant monitoring costs (per unit). Here, we consider
that the monitoring costs symbolically represent the degree of imperfection in nancial markets.
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Rd;t 1 and Rf;t 1 are determined before the realization of !t(j). So, if the realized
!t(j) is below !t(j), then the rm j defaults. In the case of default, uncollateralized
lenders cannot obtain all the contracted return Rd;t 1Dt 1(j). If rm j defaults,
uncollateralized lenders have to pay monitoring costs to observe the realized return.
The monitoring cost for uncollateralized lenders is  d (in gross term) per unit nominal
debt. Here we assume that  d is strictly larger than  s, considering the existence of
bankruptcy costs paid by debt holders, which include accounting costs, legal costs,
and losses associated with asset liquidation 11 ; 12.
Because we have assumed that collateralized borrowing does not require any mon-
itoring costs, the lending rate on collateralized borrowing (Rf;t 1) must be lower than
the expected return on stocks (Et 1Rs;t) and the lending rate on uncollateralized bor-
rowing (Rd;t 1) in equilibrium. So, rm j has an incentive to raise as much funds
as possible via collateralized borrowing. However, we assume that rms cannot raise
all its desired funds via collateralized borrowing because of the following quantitative
constraint:
Ft 1(j) 5 Qs;t 1St 1(j); where 0 <  < 1: (12)
The introduction of this constraint is motivated from Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] 13.
As we can see in (12), a decline in equity prices (Qs;t 1) reduces available funds for
collateralized borrowing. Therefore, if rm j needs to raise more funds, the rm
has to issue more stock or increase uncollateralized borrowing, which require higher
monitoring costs than collateralized borrowing 14.
Next, we should determine the allocation between stock issuing and uncollater-
alized borrowing. Because we have assumed that  d is strictly larger than  s, rms
prefer issuing stock to uncollateralized borrowing. However, here we assume that
rms are faced with some quantitative constraints in issuing stocks. We adopt the
following specication to capture this kind of constraint:
St 1(j) 5 Kt 1(j); where 0 < : (13)
We consider that this constraint roughly captures the nancial constraints facing
Japanese rms. In Japan, small and medium-sized rms cannot issue stocks in ma-
jor stock markets such as the Tokyo stock exchange. Private placements are also
highly limited. We therefore think that (13) approximates the key features of the
quantitative nancial constraints facing Japanese rms.
11Further justication for the assumption of  s < d is the fact that the statistics for St; which is
used to calculate the EVR series, include rmsinternal nances, which require no monitoring cost
to corroborate.
12BGG explicitly introduces the cost of bankruptcy, though we do not. In an empirical study,
Levin, Natalucci, and Zakrajsek [2004] estimates the relevant parameter on bankruptcy costs using
a panel-dataset. They nd that the parameter is signicant, and that it is large in recent periods.
13Kiyotaki and Moore introduces a quantitative credit constraint, in which debt repayments cannot
exceed the market value of land held by borrowers.
14Because  s and d are assumed to be strictly larger than unity, constraint (12) is virtually
always binding.
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So far we have explained the nancial constraints facing individual intermediate
goods rms. Because idiosyncratic shocks (!t(j)) are cancelled out at the aggregate
level, the aggregate return on capital is written as follows:
Rk;tQk;t 1Kt 1 = Rs;tQs;t 1St 1 +Rd;t 1Dt 1 +Rf;t 1Ft 1; (14)
where Kt 1, St 1, Dt 1, and Ft 1 are all aggregated variables. Rs;t is the average rate
of return on stock holding 15. For the purposes of later discussion, we represent EVR,
which is the aggregate value of stocks divided by the aggregate value of capital, as st:
st  Qs;tSt
Qk;tKt
: (15)
3.3 Final Goods Firms
Aggregate production by nal goods rms in the two sectors (consumption goods
sector and investment goods sector, indexed by  = c; i) is determined as follows:
Y ;t = A ;tY ;m;t;  = c; i; (16)
where Y ;t is aggregate production in sector  , A ;t is aggregate productivity in sector
 , and Y ;m;t is intermediate goods used in sector  (where Ym;t = Yc;m;t + Yi;m;t).
Based on each sectors aggregate production, the economy-wide aggregate production
(Yt = Yc;t + Yi;t) can be represented in Cobb-Douglas form as:
Yt = AtKt 1Ht1 ; where At 

Ac;t
Yc;m;t
Ym;t
+ Ai;t
Yi;m;t
Ym;t

Am: (17)
Under the assumption of perfect competition in nal goods markets, the wholesale
price of nal goods in sector  (P ;w;t) is determined as follows:
P ;w;t =
Pm;t
A ;t
;  = c; i: (18)
3.4 Retailers
In each sector, there are monopolistic competitive retailers. Following Calvo[1983],
we assume that each retailer in sector  gets an opportunity to change his retail price
only with probability 1    . Suppose that retailer h in sector  gets a chance to
change his retail price (P ;t(h)) in period t0. He maximizes his expected discounted
15For simplicity, we assume that there is no dividend paid to stock holders. Therefore, Rs;t is
solely composed of capital gains (Qs;t=Qs;t 1).
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prots subject to the demand for his goods (Y ;t(h)) as follows 16:
max
fP ;t(h)g
Et0
1P
t=t0
t t0 

t0pt

P ;t0(h)  P ;w;t
P ;t
Y ;t(h)

s:t: Y ;t(h) =

P ;t(h)
P ;t
 
Y ;t;  = c; i: (19)
Let P  ;t0(h) be retailer hs optimal price at t0. Then, P

 ;t0
(h) must satisfy the
following rst order condition:
1P
t=t0
t t0 
"
t0pt

P  ;t0(h)
P ;t
 
Y ;t0(h)

P  ;t0(h)
P ;t
 


   1

X ;t
#
; (20)
where X ;t is dened as the inverse of markup in sector  :
X ;t  P ;w;t
P ;t
: (21)
Let P  ;t0 be the optimal price for retailers in sector  who get the opportunity to
revise their prices at the same time as retailer j. Then, the aggregate retail price of
nal goods in sector  in period t0 (P ;t0) becomes
P ;t =

 P
1 
 ;t + (1   )(P  ;t)1 
	 1
1  ;  = c; i: (22)
3.5 Households
In period t, the representative household is faced with the following budget constraint:
Pc;tCt +Mt = WtHt   Tt +Mt 1 + (Rs;tQs;t 1St 1 +Rd;t 1Dt 1
+Rf;t 1Ft 1)  ( sQs;tSt +  dDt + Ft) : (23)
The household allocates current wealth between consumption (Ct) and money hold-
ing (Mt). Wealth consists of current labor income (Wt: wage rate) minus tax (Tt),
the initial money holding (Mt 1), return on last periods external fund provisions
(Rs;tQs;t 1St 1 +Rd;t 1Dt 1 +Rf;t 1Ft 1) minus current periods expenditure on ex-
ternal funds ( sQs;tSt +  dDt + Ft).
16The demand function for retailer hs intermediate goods (Y ;t(h)) is derived assuming the fol-
lowing production function for aggregate nal goods production:
Y ;t =
R 1
0
Y ;t(h)
 1
 dh
 
 1
:
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Lifetime utility is given by
Et0
1P
t=t0
t t0

lnCt +  ln
Mt
Pt
+  ln(1 Ht)

: (24)
Thus, instantaneous utility is separable in consumption, real money holding, and
leisure.  is xed discount factor. The household maximizes its lifetime utility (24)
subject to the budget constraint (23). Let t be the Lagrange multiplier for the budget
constraint (23) in period t. Then, for all t = t0;   ;1, the rst order conditions can
be written 17:
EtCt+1
Ct
= Rf;t

EtPc;t+1
Pc;t
 1
; (25)
Wt
Pc;tCc;t
=

1 Ht ; (26)
Mt
Pc;t
= Ct
Rf;t
Rf;t   1 ; (27)
EtRs;t+1 =  sRf;t; (28)
Rd;t =  dRf;t; (29)
Rf;t =
t
Ett+1
: (30)
3.6 Government
The government purchases consumption goods (this expenditure is denoted Gt). The
clearing condition in the nal goods market is then as follows:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt: (31)
Government expenditure is nanced by money creation (Mt  Mt 1) and lump-sum
taxes (Pc;tTt). Thus, the governments budget constraint is given by
Gt =
Mt  Mt 1
Pc;t
+ Tt: (32)
3.7 Linearized Model with Monetary Policy Rule
Here we derive the log-linearized version of our structural model. In order to make
each variable stationary, we redene yt  Yt=(AtLt); ct  Ct=(Ac;tLt); it  It=(Ai;tLt);
gt  Gt=(AtLt); kt  Kt 1=(Ai;tLt); and ht  Ht=Lt. We also dene the productivity
growth rate in the consumption goods sector to be ac;t  Ac;t=Ac;t; the population
growth rate to be nt  Lt=Lt; and the real capital price to be qt  Qk;t=Pi;t.
17From (25), discount factor used in (3) is determined as t0pt =
Ct0
Et0Ct
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For other variables, lowercase letters simply correspond to the equivalent upper case
letters.
The log-linearized model is summarized as follows 18:
byt = $cbct +$ibit + (1 $c  $i)bgt; (33)bct = Etbct+1   (brf;t   Etbc;t+1) + Etbac;t+1; (34)brk;t = (1  k)(byt   bkt + bxi;t) + bi;t + k1   bqt   bqt 1; (35)
Etbrk;t+1 = brf;t   bst; (36)bqt = '(bit   bkt); (37)bkt = bit 1 + (1  )bkt 1   bai;t   bnt; (38)bst = sbst 1 + 1$sbrkt   1 $s$s brf;t 1   bi;t   (bqt   bqt 1); (39)byt = bkt + (1  )bht; (40)byt = (1 + 1=)bht + bct   bxc;t; (41)bxc;t   bxc;t 1 = bxi;t   bxi;t 1 + bi;t   bc;t + bai;t   bac;t; (42)
bc;t = Etbc;t+1 + (1  c)(1  c)
c
bxc;t; (43)
bi;t = Etbi;t+1 + (1  i)(1  i)
i
bxi;t: (44)
where $c  C=Y ;$iI=Y ; k
1  
AmXi(y=k) + (1  )
;
   f s  d(1 + ) + g
 d+ f s  d(1 + ) + g , ' 
0(I=K) 1
00(I=K) 1
;
s 
f(1 + ) d g ( ss+ d)f(1 + ) d g s+Rk=Rf  s ; $s
f(1 + ) d g sRf=Rk+1  ss
( ss+ d)
:
(33) is the log-linealized version of (31). (34) is linearized consumption Euler
equation (from (25)). (35) is the return on capital (from (8)). (36) is arbitrage
condition relating the expected return on capital and the cost of capital.  is the
key parameter, and a strictly positive  indicates that the balance sheet channel is
18A hat (b) over a variable denotes the deviation of that variable from its steady state. A variable
or ratio with an upper bar (and without a time notation) indicates the steady state value of that
variable or ratio. Since we assume that the growth rates of Ac and Ai converge in the very long run,
$c, $i, and k are constant values.
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active 19. (37) is the price of capital relative to that of investment goods (from(7)).
(38) describes the accumulation of capital (from (2)). (39) captures the evolution
of EVR. s is the parameter generating sluggish adjustment of EVR
20. (40) is the
production function for nal goods (from (17)). (41) is the labor market clearing
condition (from (1), (6), (18), (21), and (26)). (42) gives the relationship between
xc;t and xi;t (from(18) and (21)). (43) and (44) are Phillips curves for consumption
goods and investment goods respectively (from (20) and (22)).
In order to close the model, we need to introduce a monetary policy rule. Here,
we select an average inationrule which responds to a 4-quarter moving average
ination rate for consumption goods 21:brf;t = bac;t + (bc;t + bc;t 1 + bc;t 2 + bc;t 3)=4: (45)
We have now completely linearized the model. In the next section, we estimate
this linearized model using actual Japanese data.
4 Estimation and Shock Identication
4.1 GMM Estimation
The sample period is from 1981Q1 to 2003Q1. Details about data sources are given
in Appendix C. The estimation method is GMM 22. Instruments used are the lagged
variables for each equation. In identifying a weighting matrix, we use Newey and
Wests [1987] method 23 ;24.
19Note that  becomes zero when there is no monitoring cost ( s = d = 1). See Appendix A for
details about the derivation of equation (36).
20See Appendix B for the details about the derivation of equation (39).
21In the simulations in later sections, we introduce the zero-lower bound on the O/N call rate.
We consider that this combination of an average ination rule and the zero lower bound roughly
approximates the actual monetary policy conducted by the Bank of Japan specically the zero
interest rate policy (ZIRP) followed during 1999-2000, which the Bank committed itself to continue
until concern about deation was dispelled; and the quantitative monetary easing policy (QMEP)
adopted in March 2001, which the Bank is committed to continue until the CPI ination rate becomes
zero or higher on a sustainable basis. It should be noted that this policy rule does not capture these
commitments precisely. In particular, it neglects the e¤ects of expanding current account balances
at the BOJ far more than the reserve requirements.
22Some recent empirical studies involving dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models
use Bayesian estimation as an alternative (Smets and Wouters [2004]).
23Because we do not have accurate data for the return on capital (Rk;t), we cannot directly
estimate equation (36). Therefore, we jointly estimate the following equation, which is obtained by
substituting (35) into (36):
(1  k)(Etbyt+1   Etbkt+1 + Etbxi;t+1) + Etbi;t+1 + k1  Etbqt+1   bqt = brf;t   bst
24Because we do not know the steady state value of each variable a priori, we estimate the model
by including constant terms, and identify each variables steady state value from the estimated
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The estimated parameters are presented in Figure 6. The most important pa-
rameter in this analysis is , which quanties the importance of the balance sheet
channel. That is, a large (small)  indicates a wide (narrow) balance sheet channel.
As a limiting case, if  is zero, it means that balance sheet channel does not exist
and EVR is irrelevant to the determination of investment.
As we see in Figure 6, the estimated  is 0.038. In order to examine the statistical
signicance of this estimate, we carry out a likelihood ratio test. Figure 7 shows
the test result. The result shows that the estimated  is statistically meaningful at
the 5% signicant level. Therefore, based on our GMM result, we can state that, in
Japan, the balance sheet channel is active.
Next, we should consider whether the estimated  is large or small. In the original
BGG,  is calibrated to 0.05 25. Hall and Wehterilt[2002] tries various di¤erent cali-
brations for , ranging from 0.029 to 0.089. In a recent empirical study, Christensen
and Dib [2004] estimates a BGG-style model by maximum likelihood method, and
shows that the point estimate of  to be 0.0377 for the sample period from 1979Q3 to
2003Q3 26. This result is surprisingly close to ours. Of course, since sample countries
are di¤erent, we do not have any reason to expect that our  should be close to theirs.
However, this result may be thought to broadly support the plausibility of our point
estimate 27.
s is another important parameter in our framework. We can interpret (39) as
a partial EVR adjustment process. Therefore, if s is close to 1 (but less than 1),
it means the speed of adjustment is slow. Our estimated s (0.942) supports this
picture of sluggish EVR adjustment.
Among the other parameters, the so-called Calvo parameters (c, i) are of
interest. Our estimates are 0.742 for c, and 0.824 for i. These values may be
considered fairly plausible in light of Fuchi and Watanabe [2002], which reports that
the Calvo parameter for the overall Japanese ination rate ranges from 0.754 to 0.909,
depending on the specication of the regression form 28 ; 29.
constant term and parameters.
25Fukunaga [2002] also uses this value.
26The standard error is 0.0143.
27In another empirical study using US data, Meier and Muller [2004] matches the impulse responses
from a BGG-type model to the responses of VARs. Their estimates of  range from 0.0658 to 0.0797,
depending on the weighting matrix in the distance between the impulse responses of the BGG-type
model and the VARs, as well as the number of matching periods. Although these values are larger
than ours, the signicance of their estimates is somewhat unclear since their standard errors are
large. The di¤erence with our result need not, therefore, be a cause of undue concern.
28Fuchi and Watanabe also estimates a New Keynesian Phillips curve specied in rst-di¤erences.
However, because our estimates are specied in levels, here we only refer to their level-based Calvo
parameters.
29The result that c is less than i is also consistent with Fuchi and Watanabes industry-specic
level estimates, which show that the Calvo parameters are low in foods (0.768) and textiles (0.670),
but are high in metal products (0.828), general machinery (0.843), electrical machinery (0.825), and
transportation equipment (0.872).
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In the monetary policy rule, the responsiveness to the average ination rate is
1.448, which satises the so-called Taylor Principle. The estimated target ination
rate is about 1.65% annually, which is also reasonable in light of economic arguments
which support the desirability of a small but positive target ination rate 30.
4.2 Identifying Net Worth Shocks
In Section2, we looked into the characteristics of EVR shocks identied by VAR
analysis. Here, we identify the corresponding shocks using the Japanese nancial
accelerator model. Following Gilchrist and Leahy [2002], we refer to this type of
shock as a net worth shock. In our framework, a net worth shock corresponds to
the disturbance term ("s;t) in the determination of bst below:
bst = sbst 1 + 1$sbrk;t   1 $s$s brf;t 1   bi;t   (bqt   bqt 1) + "s;t (46)
Net worth shocks ("s;t) capture that part of the movements of bst, which cannot
be explained by the structural equations. There are two main reasons why net worth
shocks appear in the determination of bst: First, observed bqt departs from simulatedbqt in the determination of the stock price (37) because the actual stock price includes
non-fundamental factors. This departure comes into the fth term (bqt   bqt 1) in
the above equation. Second, the stock price is included in the determination of the
return on capital (brk;t). Thus, the departure of observed bqt from simulated bqt again
inuences EVR (st) in the second term of (46) through the determination of the
return on capital (brk;t) 31.
The solid line in Figure 8 shows net worth shocks identied by the Japanese
nancial accelerator model. Surprisingly, net worth shocks are quite closely correlated
with the EVR shocks identied by the VARs in Section 2 (the correlation coe¢ cient
between the two shocks is 0.94). This result is noteworthy because we have no a priori
reason to expect the evolution of rmsnet worth in these two models to coincide.
One possible interpretation of this result is to appeal to the idea that Japanese EVR
is largely determined by some exogenous factors. Such an interpretation is supported
by Figure 4, which points to a high correlation between EVR shocks and changes in
equity prices. Based on the identied shocks in these two models, we can reasonably
conjecture that uctuations in Japanese rmsbalance sheets are mostly caused by
exogenous shocks to equity prices.
30For example, Summers [1991] and Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry [1996].
31The backward-looking nature of equation (46) makes this identication possible.
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5 Simulations
5.1 Impulse Response to Net Worth Shock
In this section, we use the Japanese nancial accelerator model to provide a quantita-
tive evaluation of nancial accelerator e¤ects. Here, we look at the impulse responses
of macroeconomic variables to a temporary net worth shock.
Figure 9 shows the impulse responses of endogenous variables to a -1% temporary
net worth shock ("s;t) in equation (46). Because our point estimate of s in equation
(39) is close to 1 (0.942), the impulse response of EVR is highly persistent. Since the
balance sheet channel is active ( > 0), a fall in EVR raises the cost of capital, so
there is a persistent decline in investment. This persistence is the main characteristic
of responses to a net worth shock. That is, for other exogenous shocks such as
productivity or monetary policy shocks, the response to a temporary shock typically
disappears within a few periods. However, in the case of a net worth shock, the
response remains for a considerable period.
The simulated response indicates that a -1% net worth shock has a signicant
impact on investment (-0.4% at its peak). The decline in investment directly reduces
real GDP and real marginal costs, thereby pushing down the CPI. In response to the
decline in the CPI, the call rate also drops, so that investment slowly returns to its
baseline.
These impulse responses to a net worth shock are largely consistent with the
responses of the VARs in Section 2. In both VARs and the Japanese nancial accel-
erator model, the responses of EVR persist for more than 16 quarters. As a result,
the responses of real GDP to changes in EVR are also persistent in both models. We
consider that this persistence captures the key feature of the dynamics of the Japanese
economy, which experienced a prolonged adjustment lasting from the bursting of the
asset price bubbles until the early 2000s 32.
5.2 Historical Impacts of Net Worth Shocks
Our goal in this section is to evaluate the historical impact of net worth shocks on
Japans economy. For this purpose, we now add the identied historical net worth
shocks to the disturbance term in equation (46).
Figure 10 shows the impact of identied net worth shocks on Japanese investment,
real GDP, and CPI. The shaded bar in the upper gure shows the historical impact
of net worth shocks on investment. First of all, we notice that, during Japans
asset price bubbleperiod in the latter half of 1980s, net worth shocks pushed up
investment considerably. At its peak, investment deviated above its steady state
32We believe this interpretation to be natural because the alternative hypothesis, namely that the
persistent decline in Japanese investment sprang from productivity or other shocks, would require
these shocks to have hit the Japanese economy almost continuously.
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level by about 50% due to this factor. From the middle of 1990, investment declined
sharply because of negative net worth shocks caused by the collapse of Japans bubble
economy. From the middle of 1990 to the beginning of 1993, EVR persistently acted
to constrain investment, to the tune of about -30%.
From the beginning of 1997, EVR again pushed down investment. In particular,
there was a sharp fall in stock prices at the end of 1997 as the bankruptcy of sev-
eral large nancial institutions triggered a rise in rmsuncertainty about funding
availability, and this acted as a major drag on investment during 1998. EVR also
contributed to a further decline in investment from the latter half of 2000, when the
collapse of the IT bubblein the US pushed down Japanese stock prices.
The middle panel shows the impact of EVR on real GDP. Since consumption
is not directly inuenced by EVR, the total impact of net worth shocks on real
GDP is smaller than on investment. However, positive net worth shocks contributed
considerably to the rise in real GDP during the bubble, and negative net worth shocks
acted as a fairly persistent drag on real GDP, especially after 1997. Based on the
results here, we can infer that the nancial accelerator played a major role in the long
stagnation of Japans economy since the 1990s.
Negative net worth shocks also pushed down Japans ination rate. The shaded
bar in the bottom panel shows the impact of net worth shocks on the CPI. This panel
indicates that, after 1990, net worth shocks contributed considerably to the decline in
the CPI during at least three periods: 1990-92, 1996-98, and 2000-03. In particular,
it is striking that, without net worth shocks, Japan would have not experienced
deation in recent years. Therefore, according to this result, recent deation in the
CPI is almost entirely explained by this negative nancial accelerator e¤ect. However,
it should be noted that this result may be partially attributed to the linearity of the
Phillips curve in our model. In light of other empirical studies which emphasize the
nonlinearity of the Phillips curve around a zero ination rate (such as Nishizaki and
Watanabe [2000]), it would be fair to say that the actual impact on the CPI may be
somewhat smaller than suggested by this study.
6 Discussion
The above analysis suggests that the formation and collapse of the asset price bubble
were the major reasons for the large swings observed in business cycles during this
period, especially during the long stagnation during 1990s and early 2000s. We now
consider the relationship between our study and other explanations of Japans long
stagnation.
Based on a traditional growth accountingapproach, Hayashi and Prescott [2002]
explains that the major cause of the long stagnation is a decline in total factor
productivity (TFP) growth coupled with a reduction in the working week. The
implications of our study may be seen as complementing their explanation, because
in the simulations in Section 5 of our analysis, real economic variables such as GDP,
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consumption, and investment, are de-trended by their respective productivity growth
rates, all of which are seen to decline signicantly in the 1990s. In other words, our
study shows that nancial accelerator e¤ects were important in explaining business
cycles, which are dened in terms of deviations of real economic variables from their
steady states.
We do not, however, mean to assert that nancial accelerator e¤ects are totally
independent of the decline in TFP growth. Rather, our view is that some part of
the decline in asset prices may be attributed to the decline in TFP growth because
asset prices are largely determined by investorsperceptions regarding future produc-
tivity growth. From this view point, we can conjecture that some part of nancial
accelerator e¤ects was originally caused by the decline in TFP growth.
Furthermore, it is even conceivable that the causality may have run in the other
direction, in other words that nancial accelerator e¤ects contributed to the decline
in TFP growth. This possibility is suggested by the recent empirical studies of
Kawamoto [2004] and Nakakuki, Otani, and Shiratsuka [2004], which show that the
decline in TFP growth mainly comes from the ine¢ cient allocation of resource inputs.
Although our BGG-style framework cannot incorporate this kind of distributional
mechanism in an explicit way, a scenario in which nancial market imperfections
prevent resources from being reallocated e¢ ciently seems plausible. In this sense, a
comprehensive assessment of the inuence of excessive debt on Japanese economic
growth will require more detailed research into the relationship between nancial
market imperfections and resource reallocation.
The remaining issue is to nd a way to lessen the persistence associated with the
impact of net worth shocks on the real economy. One policy option would be to try to
reduce the monitoring costs ( s,  d) directly. In our model, these costs symbolically
represent the extent to which nancial systems are imperfect. Therefore, policies
aimed at enhancing the functioning of nancial systems, such as the promotion of
securitization, may help reduce  s and  d, and thereby weaken the long run impact
of net worth shocks.
The other policy option would be to identify an optimal policy response to net
worth shocks. This issue is related to the argument whether monetary policy should
respond to uctuations in asset prices, which is discussed in Bernanke and Gertler
[2001]. Further investigation in this area is warranted if we are to successfully identify
monetary policy options capable of mitigating the undesirable economic uctuations
caused by exogenous shocks to asset prices.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have carried out a historical evaluation of the nancial accelerator
e¤ects, which were mainly generated by the changes in asset prices, operating on
Japans economy since the 1980s. We have found that the balance sheet channel
is statistically signicant and that the identied net worth shocks had a large and
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persistent impact on Japanese macroeconomic variables during the last two decades.
This result strongly suggests that the nancial accelerator e¤ects were indispensable
to explain the mechanism behind Japans long stagnation during the 1990s and early
2000s, as well as indicating that the deation of general prices since the late 1990s
has been at least partly attributed to the same cause.
Appendix A: Derivation of (36)
Multiply (14) by t=t 1 like this:

t
t 1
Rk;tQk;t 1Kt 1= 
t
t 1
Rs;tQs;t 1St 1+
t
t 1
Rd;t 1Dt 1+
t
t 1
Rf;t 1Ft 1:
(A1)
Insert (28), (29), (30) into (A1). The result is as follows:

t
t 1
Rk;tQk;t 1Kt 1=  sQs;t 1St 1+ dDt 1+F t 1: (A2)
Use (12) and (15) to yield the following:
Rk;t= Rf;t 1 [ d + f s    d(1 + ) + g st 1] : (A3)
Then, by log-linearizing (A3), we obtain (36).
Appendix B: Derivation of (39)
Combination of (9), (12), (14), and (15) yields the following equation:
f(1 + ) d gRf;t 1st 1+Rk;t= Rs;tst 1 +  dRf;t 1: (A4)
The log-linearized version of (A4) is as follows:
$0( bRf;t 1+bst 1) + (1 $0) bRk;t= $00( bRs;t+bst 1) + (1 $00) bRf;t 1; (A5)
where $0  f(1 + ) d gRfsf(1 + ) d gRfs+Rk
; $00  Rss
Rss+  dRf
From (12), (13), and the denition ofRs;t Qs;t=Qs;t 1, we get the following expression:
Rs;t=
st
st 1
qt
qt 1
Pi;t
Pi;t 1
: (A6)
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Substitute the log-linearized version of (A6) into (A5). Then, we can obtain the following
equation:
bst=$0
$00
bst 1+1 $0
$00
bRk;t 1 $0  $00
$00
bRf;t 1 (bqt bqt 1) bi;t: (A7)
This is the same form as (39).
Appendix C: Data Sources
All data is quarterly. GDP (Yt), consumption (Ct), investment (It), and government
expenditure (Gt) are from Cabinet O¢ ces National Accounts (93SNA). As for labor, we
generate the series Ht, by multiplying the number of employed personsin the Statistics
Bureaus Labor Force Survey with the total hours worked for establishments with at least
5 employeesin the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfares Monthly Labor Survey. For
Lt, we use the population of 15 years old or more in the Labor Force Survey. For the
capital stock (Kt), we use gross capital stock including the construction in progressfrom
the Cabinet O¢ ces Statistics on the Capital Stock of Private Enterprises. For prices, we
use the Statistics Bureaus CPI excluding fresh foodas Pc;t and the investment deator
from the National Accounts for Pi;t. Qt is calculated as the total value of rms (see Note
2 in Figure 1) divided by the capital stock. Rf;t is the O/N call rate.
Because we have to measure some variables in e¢ ciency unit (such as yt, ct, it, gt, and
kt), we need to obtain the data on the productivity trends for consumption and invest-
ment. Since we assume Cobb-Douglas technology, productivity growth can be interpreted
as Harrod-neutraltechnological progress. In such a case, trend productivity for each type
of good (consumption goods and investment goods) must be equivalent to the ratio between
the wage rate and the price of the corresponding good. We thus use the HP-ltered ratio of
the wage rate to each goods price as the productivity for that good (Ac;t; and Ai;t), where
we use total cash earningsfrom the Monthly Labor Survey divided by employed persons
in the Labor Force Survey as the wage rate (Wt). Real marginal costs for each of the nal
goods (Xc;t and Xi;t) are calculated as the ratio of the wholesale price to the price of the
corresponding nal goods (Pc;t and Pi;t). Wholesale prices (Pc;w;t and Pi;w;t) are taken from
consumer goodsand capital goodsin the Bank of Japans Corporate Goods Price Index
(CGPI).
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Notes : 1. The value of equity is “Shares and other equities” of “Private nonfinancial corporations”,
             Flow of Funds Account.  Data up to 1997Q3 are calculated from “Total market value
             of listed Stocks (Tokyo stock market 1st section)”.
            2. The value of the firm is the sum of the value of debt and the value of equity.  The value
              of debt is the sum of “Loans” and “Securities other than shares” of “Private nonfinancial
              corporations”,  the Flow of Funds Account.  Data up to 1997Q3 are calculated from the
              Flow of Funds Account based on 68SNA.
Figure 1: Ratio of Firms' Equity Value to Their Total Value (EVR)
 
Figure 2: Impulse Responses of the VARs 
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Notes: 1. EVR, LCPIS, LYS, R, and M1S are the ratio of firms’ equity value to their total value, 
real GDP, overnight call rate, and M1, respectively. CPI, real GDP, and M1 are in 
logarithmic form and seasonally adjusted. EVR and R are in level form and are not 
seasonally adjusted.  
2. Each Panel shows the sixteen-quarter response of the given row variable to a shock to 
a given column variable. Impulse responses are orthogonalized recursively in the order 
shown above. Dashed lines indicate two standard error bands, calculated by Monte 
Carlo method with ten thousand repetitions.  
3. The estimation includes four lags and a constant.  
 
 
Figure 3: Variance Decomposition of the VARs 
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Note: Each Panel shows the sixteen-quarter forecast error variance decomposition, based on the 
main VARs. Dashed lines indicate two standard error bands, calculated by Monte Carlo 
method with ten thousand repetitions.  
 
Figure 4: EVR Shocks Identified by the VARs
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Figure 5: Overview of the Japanese Financial Accelerator Model 
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Figure 6. Estimation Results of the Japanese Financial  
Accelerator Model 
 
 
Method: GMM, quarterly data over the period 1981/QI -2003/QI. 
 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
cϖ  0.564 0.002 
iϖ  0.168 0.001 
kβ  0.987 0.005 ν  0.038 0.019 ϕ  0.866 0.053 
δ  0.019 0.000 
sβ  0.942 0.011 
sϖ  0.497 0.016 
α  0.661 0.003 η  6.353 0.018 β  0.997 0.000 
cα  0.742 0.049 
iα  0.824 0.319 
πφ  1.448 0.073 
 
Note: The parameters cϖ , iϖ ,α , andη  are separately estimated. 
For these parameters, the instruments used include two lags of the 
variables and a one-lag Newey-West estimate of the covariance 
matrix is used (J-statistics = 37.415 [p-value 0.136]). For other 
variables, the instruments used include one lag of the variables of 
each equation. Also a two-lag Newey-West estimate of the 
covariance matrix is used (J-statistics = 28.963 [p-value 0.571]). 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 7. Likelihood Ratio Test on the 
Balance Sheet Channel Parameter 
 
 
Likelihood ratio test with the null hypothesis of 0=ν  
 
Number of 
Observations 
Degrees of 
Freedom LR-statistic P-value 
89 29 4.317  0.038  
 
Note: LR statistic follows a χ2 distribution. 
 
 
 
 
    Note : The correlation coefficient between the two shocks is 0.94.
Figure 8: Net Worth Shocks Identified by the Japanese
Financial Accelerator Model
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Figure 9: Impulse Responses to a Net Worth Shock
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  Figure 10: Impact of Net Worth Shocks on the Japan's Economy
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Note :  Impact of shocks shows the responses of endogenous variables to net worth shocks identified by the Japanese
            financial accelerator model (presented in Figure 8). It is expressed in deviations from steady state.
